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Breaking the Bank: Reconsidering Central




In this era of heightened awareness of corporate wrongdoing, the role of
"gatekeepers" - those charged with policing and preventing bad behavior - is
coming under intense scrutiny. Precisely what role gatekeepers should play,
and what liability they should face if they fail to perform their role ade-
quately, is the subject of great debate. Consequently, those actors usually
thought of as gatekeepers - auditors, accountants and lawyers, among others
- face a confusing array of legal precedents and largely untested legal re-
gimes as they try to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law. The
uncertainty they face is harmful for the gatekeepers, for those who attempt to
hold them accountable and for the legal system as a whole, as it undermines
the fundamental goal of clarity and certainty of law.
This Article addresses one small aspect of gatekeeper liability, arguing
that it is time to reinstate aiding and abetting liability for such "secondary
actors" in suits brought by private parties under Section 10(b) and Rule I Ob-5
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "'34 Act").' Although the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission (the "SEC") currently has the authority to pursue
such claims, the Supreme Court in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First In-
terstate Bank of Denver, N.A. ("Central Bank")2 held that private parties do
not. Because aiding and abetting liability is an important weapon in the fight
to deter corporate fraud and because the Supreme Court is unlikely to reverse
its course on the issue, Congress must act. It could easily do so by adding a
provision to the Public Company Accounting and Investor Protection Act of
2002, commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Sarbanes-Oxley," or
"SOX") 3 expressly authorizing a private right of action for aiding and abet-
ting liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Empowering private parties to pursue aiding and abetting claims will
provide a needed avenue of recourse to investors who suffer serious harm
* Professor Taylor teaches corporate courses at the Sturm College of Law at
the University of Denver. She has an L.L.M. from Columbia University and a J.D.
from New York University School of Law.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-nn (2000).
2. 511 U.S. 164 (1994), superseded by statute, Private Sec. Litig. Reform Act
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737 (1995).
3. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
1
Taylor: Taylor: Breaking the Bank
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
when gatekeepers fail to deter fraud. It will enhance the deterrence of im-
proper behavior in the securities industry and will increase investor confi-
dence in the capital markets.
This Article makes the case for reinstating the ability of private parties
to bring aiding and abetting liability claims against gatekeepers by demon-
strating that judicial and Congressional will supports such an effort. It first
defines "gatekeepers" and explains their role in the securities arena. The Arti-
cle then discusses the decision in Central Bank and explains the turmoil that
the decision caused for courts seeking to hold gatekeepers liable. It then looks
at the decision handed down by the court that considered the liability of vari-
ous actors for Enron's implosion, and argues that the decision shows strong
judicial commitment to expanding gatekeeper liability. Next, the Article ex-
amines Sarbanes-Oxley and its impact on gatekeeper liability, arguing that in
passing that Act, Congress demonstrated solid commitment to holding secon-
dary actors to account. Finally, it proposes a method of reinstating aiding and
abetting liability and weighs the arguments for and against taking such a step,
concluding that it would be beneficial to all if aiding and abetting liability is
reinstated for private party claims.
II. DEFINING "GATEKEEPER"
A "gatekeeper" is generically defined as a third party, who by virtue of
his position has the ability to prevent another person from engaging in illegal
or inappropriate behavior. In the corporate context, gatekeepers include par-
ticipants who facilitate transactions, although they are not the main partici-
pants in the transactions themselves. Auditors, accountants, banks and law-
yers are corporate gatekeepers.4 Gatekeepers, also referred to as secondary
actors, have the ability to monitor corporate conduct and help prevent fraud
by refusing to provide their necessary assistance if they find evidence of
wrongdoing by the primary participants in a transaction. For example, an
auditor who discovers an anomaly in an issuer's financial statements can re-
fuse to issue a necessary opinion letter. Conversely, gatekeepers may help
perpetuate a fraud by allowing a transaction to continue despite evidence of
the primary actors' wrongdoing. Consider, for example, a lawyer who during
the course of due diligence discovers financial impropriety in an issuers'
books, but says nothing and allows public documents containing the misrep-
resentations to be filed. While the attorney may not have participated directly
in working a fraud on investors, she has allowed fraud to occur when it may
have been in her power to prevent it, assuming that responsible parties at the
4. For useful descriptions of gatekeepers and their functions see Ronald J. Gil-
son, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE
L.J. 239 (1984); Reiner H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
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issuer would have responded appropriately if she alerted them to the impro-
priety. Thus, she has failed as a gatekeeper.
It is precisely this kind of gatekeeper failure that continues to generate
extensive discussion. Corporate gatekeeper behavior is at the center of the
storm over how best to monitor corporate behavior because of the abject fail-
ure of such actors in recent years to perform the job expected of them. De-
spite the presence of gatekeepers at virtually every step of the way, rampant
corporate fraud did happen at companies such as Enron and WorldCom, to
name just a few of the more dramatic examples. Clearly, the parties the secu-
rities industry traditionally relied on to help monitor the field proved woefully
inadequate for the job. This drastic gatekeeper failure naturally leads to ques-
tions about why it occurred, and what might be done to prevent similar failure
in the future.5 While the explanations for gatekeeper failure and suggestions
for its reform vary, there is common recognition that gatekeepers are essential
to the functioning of U.S. capital markets. Therefore, rather than eliminating
their role, most considering the issue advocate enhancing their power and
responsibility. The need for enhancing gatekeeper power and accountability
comes not only from legal academicians but also from courts and Congress.
Decisions such as the one issued by the court that considered the implosion at
Enron6 show judicial concern with the role of gatekeepers and reflect a com-
mitment on the part of courts to hold secondary actors liable for failure to
perform their functions adequately. The need for stronger gatekeepers is also
on the mind of Congress, as demonstrated with the enactment of Sarbanes-
Oxley, which explicitly made gatekeeper functions a primary focus of reform.7
As important as recent decisions and SOX are in establishing more
clearly defined gatekeeper responsibilities, they do not answer a serious issue
that has long plagued the corporate bar. Specifically, they do not clarify the
appropriate threshold of liability for gatekeepers who fail to perform their
proscribed roles properly. The issue of gatekeeper liability has been contro-
versial since the United States Supreme Court decided Central Bank of Den-
ver v. First Interstate Bank8 in 1994, and in a surprising move, eliminated the
ability of private parties to bring aiding and abetting claims under Section
10(b) and Rule I Ob-5. 9 As discussed below, Central Bank largely insulated
5. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Chal-
lenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REv. 301 (2004); Peter B. Oh,
Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735 (2004).
6. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.),
235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
7. For discussion of specific provisions of SOX focusing on gatekeeper liabil-
ity, see infra Part IV. See also Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified
Legal Compliance Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the
Board of Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517 (2003).
8. 511 U.S. 164 (1994) superseded by statute, Private Sec. Litig. Reform Act of
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gatekeepers from liability for fraud, but did not protect them entirely. Instead,
the decision caused great confusion and uncertainty as to when and how gate-
keepers might be held liable when fraud occurred.
III. THE CENTRAL BANK DECISION
From the time Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 came into being in the
1930s until the mid-1990s, federal courts uniformly recognized a private
cause of action for aiding and abetting under Section 10(b), the general anti-
fraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.10 Although the stat-
ute itself does not explicitly mention aiding and abetting liability, courts
quickly adopted the position that to further the '34 Act's basic philosophy of
seeking to create and maintain a securities market free from fraud, private
parties, as well as governmental entities could impose liability under Section
10(b) on those who do no more than aid and abet violations of that section.1'
Decided in 1994, Central Bank changed the playing field dramatically
and marked the end of straight-forward aiding and abetting liability under
section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5. Central Bank involved claims arising out of
bond offerings Colorado Springs-Stetson Hill Public Building Authority
("Authority") made in 1986 and 1988 for which Central Bank of Denver
served as the indenture trustee. 2 The bond covenants required that the bonds
10. Section 10(b) states that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange ... [t]o use or employ, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange... any manipulative or deceptive device or contriv-
ance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
Under Section 10(b), Rule 1Ob-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2005).
11. See, e.g, Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680
(N.D. Ind. 1966) (discussing the expansion of Section 10(b) standing)
12. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 167.
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be secured by real estate having an appraised value of at least 160% of the
outstanding principal and interest.' 3 The first offering was made without inci-
dent. 14 However, although the real estate market in Colorado was suffering a
serious decline at the time of the offerings, the appraisal of the collateral for
the second offering did not reflect any change, but indicated that the value
had remained essentially the same.' 5 When the lead underwriter questioned
the accuracy of the appraisal, Central Bank decided that an independent ap-
praisal was necessary, but delayed that action until after the completion of the
second bond offering in 198816 Thereafter, and before any independent re-
view was done, the Authority defaulted on its bonds. 17 First Interstate, who
had purchased over $2 million of bonds as part of the second issue, sued.' 8 As
part of its claim, First Interstate alleged that Central Bank of Denver had
aided and abetted Authority's fraudulent scheme by failing to obtain an accu-
rate appraisal of the collateral.' 9
In the initial phases of the proceedings, and in keeping with the then pre-
vailing understanding of liability under Section 10(b), the parties and the
court accepted that aiding and abetting liability existed under Section 10(b),
but differed over Central Bank's culpability.20 Of its own initiative, the Su-
preme Court raised the question of whether aiding and abetting liability was
appropriate at all under that section.2 1 In a 5-4 majority opinion that surprised
most commentators,22 the Court strictly interpreted the text of the '34 Act and
held that no private right of action for aiding and abetting existed under the
section in question.23 The Court noted that the words "aid" and "abet" do not
appear in the statute, and rejected the SEC's argument that the phrase "di-
rectly or indirectly" in Section 10(b) shows Congressional intent to reach
aiding and abetting.24 The Court reasoned that permitting aiding and abetting
13. Id.






20. Id. at 186-88.
21. See id. at 182-84, 191. The Court had expressly declined to address this issue
many years earlier in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.7 (1976).
22. See, e.g, David J. Baum, The Aftermath of Central Bank of Denver: Private
Aiding and Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
1817 (1995); Sean G. Blackmun, Note, An Analysis of Aider and Abettor Liability
Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Central Bank of Denver
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1323 (1995); James D. Red-
wood, Toward a More Enlightened Securities Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court?
Don't Bank on it Anytime Soon, 32 Hous. L. REV. 3 (1995).
23. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
24. Id. at 176-77.
2006]
5
Taylor: Taylor: Breaking the Bank
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
liability to reach secondary actors on the theory that such actors are indirectly
engaging in the fraud of the primary actors would reach "persons who do not
engage in the proscribed activities at all, but who give a degree of aid to those
who do."25 For the Court, such an extension of liability was not statutorily
justified. Reasoning that "Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting
liability when it chose to do so," the Court concluded that "the text of the
1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and abet a § 10(b) violation." 26
While this holding clearly shut down the right of an individual to pursue
a gatekeeper on an aiding and abetting claim under Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5,27 the Court did not protect corporate gatekeepers from all liability.
Instead, in a statement that would lead to great interpretive confusion, the
Court found that
[t]he absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean
that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from
liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a
lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device
or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a pur-
chaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary viola-
tor under lOb-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary li-
ability under Rule I Ob-5 are met.2
8
Essentially then, after Central Bank, corporate gatekeepers cannot be
found liable for aiding and abetting, but can be found liable if their conduct is
sufficiently pro-active that they can be characterized as a primary violator.
With respect to private party actions, this remains the state of the law today.
29
If a plaintiff can establish the necessary elements of a 1Ob-5 claim, which
include proof that a defendant: (1) made a misstatement or omission;30 (2) of
a material fact; 31 (3) with scienter;32 (4) on which the plaintiff relied;33 (5) in
25. Id. at 179.
26. Id. at 176-77.
27. Originally, all parties were barred by Central Bank from pursing aiding and
abetting claims. However, as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, the SEC was given the power to do so through an amendment to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. See Sec. Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78e (2000).
28. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
29. The SEC was granted authority to pursue aiding and abetting claims under §
10(b) and Rule 1 0(b)5 by the Public Securities Litigation Reform Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78e.
30. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
31. See id.
32. To establish the requisite scienter, the plaintiff must plead with particularity
that the defendant acted with the "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 & n.12 (1976).
33. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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connection with the purchase or sale of a security; 34 and (6) the plaintiffs
reliance caused her injury,35 her claim may go forward.
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF CENTRAL BANK
The decision in Central Bank forced lower courts to confront the sticky
issue of who would be considered a primary violator, and therefore poten-
tially liable under Section 10(b), and who would be merely a secondary actor
not subject to liability, although involved in the fraud to some degree. In
other words, courts have had to determine at what point a gatekeeper, through
her conduct, has crossed the line from merely serving in an advisory capacity
to serving as a primary actor in the transaction. Over time, two tests have
developed to answer this question, each leading to very different results.
A. The Bright Line Test
Used by a majority of jurisdictions, the bright line test is the more re-
strictive of the tests imposing liability on gatekeepers. The test requires that
to be considered a primary violator, and therefore subject to potential liabil-
ity, an actor must "make" a false or misleading statement, and that the mis-
statement must be attributed to the gatekeeper at the time it is disseminated to
the public.36 For jurisdictions adopting the bright line test, strict adherence to
these requirements is essential to comply with Central Bank. Requiring that
the defendant "make" the statement addresses the concern voiced in Central
Bank that a liable party actually "engage" in proscribed conduct. As the Sec-
ond Circuit made clear in one of the early cases confronting the issue after
Central Bank:
[I]f Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must ac-
tually make a false or misleading statement in order to be held li-
able under Section 10(b). Anything short of such conduct is merely
aiding and abetting, and no matter how substantial that aid may be,
it is not enough to trigger liability under Section 10(b).37
Under the bright line test, the need to link the misstatement directly to
the gatekeeper is necessary to satisfy Central Bank's demand that all ele-
ments of primary liability be satisfied before a gatekeeper can be found liable.
Public attribution enables a plaintiff to claim reliance on the particular mis-
34. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
35. See Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1990).
36. See, e.g., Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (lth Cir.
2001); Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720-21 (2d Cir. 1997).
37. Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 720 (alteration in original) (quoting In re MTC Elec.
Techs S'holders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)).
2006]
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statement at issue - and of course, reliance is an element of a Section 10(b)
claim. Therefore, under the bright line test it is not enough that a misstate-
ment is made. Instead, the false or misleading statement "'must be attributed
to that specific actor at the time of public dissemination, that is, in advance of
the investment decision."'
38
The significance of the bright line test is its limiting effect on potential
gatekeeper liability. Under the test, primary actor status and its associated
liability does not extend to participants in a securities transaction who do not
sign documents, release materials under their own name or in some other way
affirmatively announce their involvement with the transaction.3 9 As long as
actors remain behind the scenes, they cannot be characterized as primary
actors and will not incur liability.
B. The Substantial Participation Test
The substantial participation test defines more gatekeeper behavior as
that of a primary violator than the bright line test. Developed in large part by
the Ninth Circuit, the test reads Central Bank more expansively and charac-
terizes an actor as a primary violator if that actor participates in the fraud in a
"significant" manner.4° The critical difference between the substantial par-
ticipation test and the bright line test is that under the substantial participation
test there is neither a requirement that the gatekeeper be named, nor that any
false statement be attributed to her directly.4 ' Thus, the substantial participa-
tion test allows primary liability to attach to secondary actors who participate
in the drafting of documents containing false or misleading statements, even
if those actors do not affirmatively make a statement in the documents, and
even when there is no misstatement publically attributed to them. Under the
substantial participation test, liability as a primary violator for such gatekeepers
is appropriate because they are "intricately involved" in the fraud,4 and there-
fore can be considered to have personally engaged in proscribed behavior.
For many years, the substantial participation test found little favor out-
side of the Ninth Circuit. Recently, however, it gained prominence in a deci-
38. Winkler v. Wigley, No 00-7624, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31332, at *8 (2d
Cir. Dec. 6, 2000) (quoting Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d
Cir. 1998)).
39. See, e.g., Ziemba, 256 F.3d 1194 (law firm involved in transaction could not
be held liable absent public statement); Wright, 152 F.3d 169 (outside auditor who
was never identified in press release at issue could not be held liable).
40. See, e.g., Dannenberg v. PaineWebber Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc.),
50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960,
971 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
41. See Howald v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000).
42. In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. at 970.
[Vol. 71
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sion involving Enron issued by Judge Melinda Harmon.43 That decision not
only approved, but arguably extended the reach of the substantial participa-
tion test, leading one commentator to note that "[u]nder the Enron ruling,
most who could formerly be reached under 'aiding and abetting' liability now
seemingly can be reached as a 'maker' or 'creator' of a public statement.""
V. ENRON AND "SUBSTANTIAL PARTICIPATION"
The implosion of Enron, which caused billions of dollars of shareholder
equity to vanish into thin air, not surprisingly led to multiple public and pri-
vate lawsuits.45 Several of the private actions were consolidated into one ma-
jor class action, filed in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas. Defendants in the class action included many secondary actors
- banks, accountants and lawyers to name a few. The Enron case thus called
the issue of primary liability for secondary actors squarely into question.
In her opinion, Judge Harmon, after an exhaustive review of Central
Bank and its progeny, adopted an expansive version of the substantial partici-
pation test, finding that "'when a person, acting alone or with others, creates a
misrepresentation [on which the investor-plaintiffs relied], the person can be
liable as a primary violator ... if ... he acts with the requisite scienter."''
The court adopted this test for primary liability directly from an amicus brief
submitted by the SEC, concluding that the approach and rationale of the SEC
with regard to primary liability under Section 10(b) was "well reasoned and
reasonable, balanced in its concern for protection for victimized investors as
well as for meritlessly harassed defendants ... in addition to the policies un-
derlying the statutory private right of action for defrauded investors and...
consistent with the language of § lOb(b), Rule lOb-5, and Central Bank. 4 7
Careful examination of the position of the SEC on secondary actor li-
ability provides helpful insight because of its wholesale adoption in the Enron
decision. In its brief (which was initially prepared in connection with a differ-
ent case4 ), the SEC strongly criticized the bright line test for gatekeeper li-
ability.49 For the SEC, the relevant issue is whether
43. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.),
235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
44. Coffee, supra note 5, at 338.
45. See Joseph Weber et al., Arthur Anderson: How Bad Will It Get?, Bus. WK.,
Dec. 24, 2001, at 30 (Enron investors lost nearly $80 billion).
46. Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 588 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 590.
48. Id. at 585-86. ("The majority of [the SEC's] pleading is a submission filed...
in a case that was pending in the Third Circuit, but which was settled before that appel-
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a person who makes a material misrepresentation, while acting
with the requisite scienter, but who does not himself disseminate
the misrepresentation to investors, and whose name is not made
known to them, is only an aider and abettor of the fraud, or is that
person a primary violator subject to liability [under § 10(b)]? 50
A critical component of the SEC argument was equating the word
"make" as used in Rule 1Ob-5 with the word "creates."5  After equating
"makes" with "creates" the SEC argued that anyone involved in the "crea-
tion" of a misstatement could be found liable for making that misstatement.
5 2
Accepting the terms as synonymous justified extending primary violator li-
ability to violators who were involved with a fraud, but who neither made an
affirmative misstatement of their own, nor had any misstatement publicly
attributed to them. As the argument goes, such actors "create" the misstate-
ment through their participation in the preparation of the documents. If done
with scienter, that creation is the equivalent of a positive assertion, and pri-
mary violator liability may attach.
The SEC justified its position by noting that the Supreme Court in Cen-
tral Bank did not set forth a bright line test for liability and that extending
liability to one who "creates" the misrepresentation supports the overall statu-
tory language of Section 10(b).53 Specifically, the SEC pointed to the lan-
guage of the section prohibiting an actor from indirectly using or employing a
deceptive device or contrivance.5 4 In other words, for the SEC, and therefore
for the Enron court, any actor who participates in the creation of a misleading
document is doing precisely what the statute forbids and therefore can be held
liable as a primary violator. Under this approach, the creation of the mis-
statement is enough. No attribution of the misstatement to the gatekeeper is or
should be required because requiring attribution "would have the unfortunate
and unwarranted consequence of providing a safe harbor from liability for
everyone except those identified with the misrepresentations by name.
55
Further, under the SEC position as adopted by Enron, not only is attri-
bution of the misstatement to the gatekeeper not required, but the gatekeeper
need not be the originator of the misstatement. Indeed,
it would not be necessary for a person to be the initiator of a mis-
representation in order to be a primary violator. Provided that a
plaintiff can plead and prove scienter, a person can be a primary
50. Id. at 586.
51. Id. at 586-87. The SEC argued that the interpretation of "make" must be
consistent with the "directly or indirectly" language in the Rule and that therefore
equating "makes" with "creates" is more appropriate than equating it with "signs." Id.
52. Id. at 587.
53. Id. at 586.
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violator if he or she writes misrepresentations for inclusion in a
document to be given to investors, even if the idea for those mis-
representations came from someone else.
56
The key to the SEC argument is premising liability on the creation of the
misrepresentation. Rather than testing the level of participation in the overall
fraud, this test simply looks at whether the gatekeeper was responsible for the
generation of a specific falsehood. Without a hand in the creation, no liability
would extend. The SEC was careful to point out that
a person who prepares a truthful and complete portion of a docu-
ment would not be liable as a primary violator for misrepresenta-
tions in other portions of the document. Even assuming such a per-
son knew of misrepresentations elsewhere in the document and
thus had the requisite scienter, he or she would not have created
those misrepresentations.
5 7
The SEC argued that extending liability to those gatekeepers who "cre-
ate" a misrepresentation better suits the statutory objectives of Section 10(b)
and does not penalizing innocent parties.58 The requirement that the pleading
party prove scienter and reliance substantially minimizes the chances of frivo-
lous claims being brought.59
In accepting the SEC position in its entirety, the Enron court clearly re-
jected the bright line test for gatekeeper liabilityi 0 It suggested that it also
rejected the "substantial participation" test, calling it "too expansive." 6' For
the court, its opinion fit squarely within the dictates of Central Bank because
the test it adopts premises liability on the creation of a misstatement. 62 This
direct involvement in the fraud is more than simple "participation." It requires
affirmative acts that cause the misstatement to come into being. For the En-
ron court "[t]he requirement that the secondary party, itself, allegedly make a
misleading or false representation (or omission) or commit a deceptive act
that violates § 10(b) brings the party within the primary liability definition of
the statue and avoids aiding and abetting pitfalls."63
Many have criticized the Enron decision, arguing that it takes "a detour
around Central Bank."64 The main objection raised by critics is that the test
56. Id. at 693.
57. Id. at 588.
58. Id. at 586-87.
59. Id. at 587.
60. ld. at 586, 591.
61. Id. at 588 n.26.
62. See id. at 591.
63. Id.
64. Gary J. Aguirre, The Enron Decision: Closing the Fraud-Free Zone on Er-
rant Gatekeepers?, 28 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 447, 447 (2003).
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the Enron court adopted covertly reinstates aiding and abetting liability by
equating "create" with "make."6 5 The commentators assert that because Cen-
tral Bank explicitly extended liability only to those who "make" a misstate-
ment and because Section 10(b) covers only those who "use" or "employ" a
manipulative device or contrivance, "make" must mean more than create.
They argue that it must include some affirmative action on the part of the
secondary actor to transmit the misstatement to the public.6 Premising liabil-
ity on the mere "creation" of a misstatement penalizes those who do no more
than participate in the creation of a fraud, and contradicts Central Bank's
prohibition of imposing liability on "persons who do not engage in the pro-
scribed activities at all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do.
' 67
Further, critics of the test adopted in Enron argue that it subverts the re-
liance element of a Section 10(b) claim.68 They reason that premising liability
on the mere creation of a misstatement, without attribution of it to an identi-
fied secondary actor, means that a plaintiff cannot claim to have relied on any
particular statement. 69 In response, supporters of the Enron test note that
theories such as fraud-on-the-market do not require individual allegations of
reliance, but allow plaintiffs to rely on the overall "integrity" of market
prices.7
0
The "correctness" of the Enron decision, while interesting and impor-
tant, is not the focus of this Article. It is evident from the careful linguistic
gymnastics of Judge Harmon's opinion that great effort went into finding an
avenue to hold secondary actors liable despite the strict limitations on such
liability after Central Bank. At the end of the day, the test adopted in Enron
lends weight to the movement of enhanced gatekeeper liability through its
clear rejection of the bright line test. Evidence of the growing desire to en-
hance gatekeeper accountability also can be seen in legislative action, as is
clearly demonstrated in Sarbanes-Oxley.
65. See. e.g., Andrew S. Gold, Reassessing the Scope of Conduct Prohibited by
Section 10(b) and the Elements of Rule lOb-5: Reflections on Fraud and Secondary
Actors, 53 CATH. U. L. REv. 667, 669-70 (2004); Cecil C. Kuhne, III, Expanding the
Scope of Securities Fraud?: The Shifting Sands of Central Bank, 52 DRAKE L. REV.
25, 42 (2003).
66. See Gold, supra note 65.
67. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 176
(1994), superseded by statute, Private Sec. Litig. Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-67, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737 (1995).
68. See Gold, supra note 65, at 677-78; 686-88; see also Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d
at 592. Despite the commentator's complaints, the opinion insists that plaintiffs will
have to show all elements to prevail.
69. See generally Mary M. Wynne, Comment, Primary Liability Amongst Sec-
ondary Actors: Why the Second Circuit's "Bright Line" Standard Should Prevail, 44
ST. Louis U. L.J. 1607 (2000).
70. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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VI. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
There is no doubt that one of the purposes of SOX is to enhance gate-
keeper liability. Senator Sarbanes, a lead sponsor of the Act, stressed that
"We have to make sure the gatekeepers are doing their job.",'7 Many sections
of SOX evidence Congressional intent to statutorily expand the obligations of
gatekeepers, primarily by attempting to establish a proscriptive regulatory
regime which mandates specific procedures to be followed. To get a sense of
this regime, a general understanding of the structure of the Act is necessary.
The following section briefly sets forth some of the more important provi-
sions of SOX. This overview is by no means intended as a comprehensive
review of the Act. After this short overview, those sections of SOX that ad-
dress gatekeeper obligations are discussed in greater detail.
A. Overview of Sarbanes-Oxley
Intended to contain "the most far-reaching reforms of American busi-
ness practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt,"" the "Public
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002," sailed
through Congress and was signed into law by President Bush on July 30,
2002. While commentators may disagree about the suitability of the
changes envisioned by SOX and debate its likely effectiveness on fraud pre-
vention, most concur that it fundamentally changes the structure of corporate
governance, giving the federal government a much greater role in what was
traditionally viewed as the provenance of the states, and agree that this
change in structure was intended to strengthen federal oversight over gate-
keepers.
74
The heart of SOX is the creation of a new self-regulatory entity, the
"Public Company Accounting Oversight Board" ("PCAOB"). 75 With the
accounting scandals of WorldCom and Enron foremost in their minds, Con-
gress established the PCAOB to help prevent a recurrence of those events.7
6
71. Pamela Bamett, Sarbanes Says Punishing 'Bad Actors' Not Enough, NAT'L
J. CONGREssDAILY, July 8, 2002, available at http://nationaljoumal.com/cgi-
bin/ifetch4?ENG+%20CONGRESS+7-.
72. See Signing Statement of George W. Bush, July 30, 2002,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/print/20020730.html.
73. See id.
74. See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corpo-
rate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625 (2004); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory
Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J.
CORP. L. 1, 57-59 (2002).
75. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 721 l(a) (2000 & Supp. 2002).
76. Michael A. Perino, Enron 's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the




Taylor: Taylor: Breaking the Bank
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
The PCAOB is charged with regulating the accounting industry, establishing
auditing standards and imposing discipline on members of the auditing pro-
fession. 7 The jurisdiction of the PCAOB over accounting firms is ensured by
Section 102 of SOX, which makes it unlawful for any person who is not reg-
istered with the Board "to prepare or issue, or to participate in the preparation
or issuance of, any audit report with respect to any issuer. ' 'T In essence, the
PCAOB is intended to fill the role for the accounting industry that the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers (the "NASD") fills for the brokerage
industry.
In addition to creating a new regulatory agency to ride herd on the ac-
counting industry, SOX imposes several substantive requirements on public
corporations directly affecting governance issues. These include, among oth-
ers, the requirements that public company audit committees be made up en-
tirely of independent directors,79 that the chief executive and chief financial
officers of all public companies certify on an on-going basis the accuracy of
their company's financial statements,80 and that corporations change their
periodic reporting to make more current and complete disclosure about their
financial conditions.8 ' Each of these provisions shows Congressional deter-
mination to have federal regulation play a more prominent role in corporate
governance.
Other provisions of SOX do not impact corporate governance as di-
rectly, but aim to increase the deterrent effect of SOX and other securities
laws. Examples of this type of provision include sections enhancing criminal
penalties for violations of the securities laws,82 extending protection to whistle-
blowers,8 3 and extending the statute of limitations for securities fraud actions.
84
77. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 103-105, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7213-7215.
78. Id. § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 7212(a).
79. Id. § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3)(B)(ii). The Act defines "independent" as
requiring that an audit committee member may not be an "affiliated person" of the cor-
poration or any subsidiary and may receive no more than a director's fee for services. Id.
80. Id. § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a). In addition to certifying the accuracy of the
reports the chief executive and chief financial officer must also certify as to the effec-
tiveness (or lack thereof) of internal controls they agree to establish and maintain. Id.
81. Id. § 409, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(/). Under this section, corporations must disclose
material changes in a "rapid and current basis." Id. Further, Section 401 requires
companies to disclose "all material off-balance sheet transactions" that might have a
"material current or future effect" on the financial health of the company. Id. § 401(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78m(j).
82. See id. § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 1520(b).
83. Id. § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a). This section creates a new criminal statute -
18 U.S.C. § 1514A - that protects whistleblowers from discharge, demotion and other
penalizing actions. Id.
84. Id. § 804, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1658(a), (b). This section changes the current statute
of limitations from one year after discovery of the facts constituting the violation or
three years after such violation occurred rule to a two year/five year rule. Id.
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The sections of SOX described so far effect significant changes to the
structure of corporate governance and take meaningful steps to increase the
likelihood that the requirements of the securities laws will be complied with.
Another category of provisions of particular relevance for this Article are
provisions that alter affirmatively the responsibilities placed on gatekeepers.
Specifically, SOX addresses directly the responsibilities of public accounting
firms and persons associated with them, 85 and of attorneys who appear before
the SEC "in any way in the representation of issuers,'" 6 among others.87 In
each case, SOX attempts to define more clearly the role that each gatekeeper
is expected to play, and provides for recourse against those who fail to per-
form their functions as mandated.
B. Public Accounting Firms and Associated Persons
As mentioned above, one of the key provisions of SOX is the creation of
the PCAOB, a regulatory body with extensive authority over public account-
ing firms. Section 103 of the Act speaks directly to the power of the Board,
calling for it to establish standards for auditing and attestation, including
quality control and ethics, to be used by all registered public accounting
firms, which effectively means any accounting firm working in the securities
industry.8 8 The Act specifically requires the PCAOB to establish rules ad-
dressing certain procedural details of how accounting firms must conduct
their auditing work. 89 The Act clearly intended these rules to increase the
obligations placed on gatekeepers as they perform their traditional functions,
and are intended to raise the level of diligence required of such actors. The
rules specify requirements regarding records retention,"° independent verifi-
cation of auditing work,91 and description and evaluation of the effectiveness
of issuers' internal control structure and procedures.
92
85. Id. § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 7215(a).
86. Id. § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245. Under this section, the SEC is to institute rules
requiring attorneys who represent pubic companies to report the described violations
first to the company's chief legal counsel or CEO. Id. § 307(1), 15 U.S.C. § 7245(1).
If that individual fails to take "appropriate action" the attorney must report the viola-
tion to the company's audit committee, to its independent directors or its entire board
of directors. Id. § 307(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7245(2).
87. Id. § 501, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(a). This section sets forth specific requirements
for rules intended to "improve the objectivity of research and provide investors with
more useful and reliable information." Id.
88. Id. § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1).
89. Id.
90. Id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2)(A)(i) (firms must prepare and
maintain records for no less than seven years). This rule is a direct reaction to the
problems caused by Arthur Anderson's shredding of documents.
91. Id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2)(A)(ii).
92. Id. § 103(a)(2XA)(iii), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2)(A)(iii).
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Another set of provisions addresses the internal governance of account-
ing firms rather than the methods by which they must conduct their external
audit functions. Rules addressing internal governance matters require, among
other things, that firms monitor professional ethics;93 have specific methods
for the sup4ervision, hiring, professional development and advancement of
personnel; and control the acceptance and continuation of engagements.95
These rules, like those governing the method of conducting audits, increase
the regulation of accounting entities and help to ensure that these gatekeepers
are held responsible.
In addition to these specific rules governing external and internal proce-
dures to be used by all registered public accounting firms, the Act charges the
PCAOB with establishing general standards to be used by such firms in the
preparation and issuance of audit reports as required by SOX or "as may be
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors." 96 The Board is granted the power to police firms for compliance with
these rules and standards, to take disciplinary actions authorized by SOX and
to report any violations it discovers to the SEC or appropriate state regulatory
authorities.97 This broad grant of authority assures that the PCAOB has the
ability to respond to any situations that may arise that were not addressed
adequately by the specific rules contained in SOX. It provides the flexibility
necessary to ensure that the newly created regulatory agency can provide
effective monitoring functions in the future.
Although the focus of SOX is the creation of the PCAOB and its man-
date to regulate public accounting firms, Congress took steps in SOX to en-
hance auditor independence without using the auspices of the PCAOB.
Through amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the law now
requires greater auditor/issuer independence by prohibiting public accounting
firms from engaging in certain specified "prohibited activities."98 After SOX,
it is unlawful for any public accounting firm performing audit functions for a
company to simultaneously engage in specified non-audit services. 99 Addi-
tionally, no firm may provide audit services to an issuer for more than five
consecutive years.l°° The Act further insures auditor/company independence
by prohibiting any firm from providing audit services to a company if an in-
sider in the capacity of CEO, CFO, or an "equivalent position" of that com-
pany was employed by the auditing firm and participated "in any capacity" in
93. Id. § 103(a)(2)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2)(B)(i).
94. Id. §§ 103(a)(2)(B)(iii)-(iv), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7213(a)(2)(B)(iii)-(iv).
95. Id. § 103(a)(2)(B)(v), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2)(B)(v).
96. Id. § 103(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1).
97. Id. §§ 104(c)(2), (3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7214(c)(2), (3).
98. Id. § 201(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g).
99. Id. Prohibited non-audit services include, among others, booking, financial
information systems design, appraisal or valuation, fairness opinions and actuarial
services. Id.
100. Id. § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j).
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auditing the issuer during the one year period preceding the date of the au-
dit.'0 These provisions have sparked plenty of controversy,'0 2 but illustrate
the Congressional intent to use SOX to strengthen the role that accounting
firms play as gatekeepers. By insisting on independence between auditors and
issuers; Congress tried to increase the likelihood that auditors would be able
to perform their gatekeeper function, free from some of the pressures - real or




In addition to placing significant obligations and responsibilities on pub-
lic accounting firms and associated person, Sarbanes-Oxley speaks directly to
the responsibilities attorneys have as gatekeepers. Section 307 of the Act calls
for the SEC to establish rules "setting forth minimum standards of profes-
sional conduct for attorneys appearing . . . before the Commission." 104 In
essence, the rules mandated by SOX require attorneys to "report up" material
violations of securities laws or breaches of fiduciary duty. "Reporting up"
means that any attorney, who discovers evidence of any such violation, must
first report the finding to the chief legal counsel or chief executive of the
company in question and, if such individual "does not appropriately respond"
to such violation, must report the evidence to the company's audit committee
or another wholly independent committee, or to the board of directors as a
whole.1
0 5
The blunt statements made by two of the principal drafters of Section
307, while SOX was under consideration, clearly illustrate the rationale for
the "reporting up requirement.". Referring to the rash of corporate scandals,
101. Id. § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(l).
102. See, e.g., Matthew J. Barrett, In the Wake of Corporate Reform: One Year in
the Life of Sarbanes-Oxley -"Tax Services" As a Trojan Horse in the Auditor Inde-
pendence Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 463; Mark J.
Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 353
(2004).
103. The pressure to perform less then assiduous audits stemmed in the past from
the conflicts of interest rampant in the auditing community at the time the Enron
scandal developed. For example, Arthur Anderson, Enron's auditor, never raised any
red flags about Enron's convoluted bookkeeping. As pointed out by the editorial
board of BusinessWeek, that fact is not surprising, as Arthur Anderson "made more
money selling consulting services to Enron last year than it did auditing the company.
Criticizing Enron's books might have jeopardized consulting work." Enron: Let Us
Count The Culprits, BUS. WK., Dec. 17, 2001, at 154; see also John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding Enron: "It's About The Gatekeepers, Stupid", 57 Bus. LAW. 1403
(2002) (explaining how "auditing function was essentially a loss leader by which
more lucrative services could be marketed").
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Senator Michael Enzi (R-Wyo.) remarked: "[O]ne of the thoughts that oc-
curred to me was that probably in almost every transaction there was a lawyer
who drew up the documents involved in that procedure.""10 6 In a similar vein,
Senator Jon Corzine (D-N.J.), the former chief executive of Goldman Sachs,
noted:
In fact, in our corporate world today - and I can verify this by my
own experiences - executives and accountants work day to day
with lawyers. They give them advice on almost each and every
transaction. That means when executives and accountants have
been engaged in wrongdoing, there have been some other folks at
the scene of the crime - and generally they are lawyers.1
0 7
By requiring attorneys to report up, Congress sought to heighten the
gatekeeper function lawyers play. Recognizing that lawyers are intimately
involved in virtually all corporate transactions, the new provision demands
that they act more effectively as monitors. As with almost all of the provi-
sions of SOX, the reporting up requirement generated significant controversy
when it was proposed. 0 8 Similarly, as with almost all of the provisions of
SOX, the reporting up requirement evidences clear Congressional intent to
enhance gatekeeper obligation.
VII. A SIMPLE PROPOSAL TO FURTHER ENHANCE GATEKEEPER
OBLIGATION
There is strong evidence that legislators and courts want to enhance the
role that gatekeepers play in maintaining the integrity of the U.S. capital mar-
kets. Enron and other cases, together with the enactment of SOX, show broad
agreement that all market participants must be held accountable for their
fraudulent conduct. Proscribing behaviors through legislation and enforcing
106. 148 CONG. REc. S6524, S6554 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Enzi).
107. Id. at S6556 (statement of Sen. Corzine).
108. See, e.g., Susan Saab Fortney, National Symposium on the Role of a Corpo-
rate Lawyer: Chicken Little Lives: The Anticipated and Actual Effect of Sarbanes-
Oxley on Corporate Lawyers' Conduct, 33 CAP. U. L. REv. 61, 68 (2004); Susan P.
Koniak, Symposium: Regulating the Lawyer: Past Efforts and Future Possibilities:
When the Hurlyburly 's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REv.
1236, 1269-71 (2003); Darlene M. Robertson & Anthony A. Tortora, Reporting Re-
quirements for Lawyers Under Sarbanes-Oxley: Has Congress Really Changed Any-
thing?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 785 (2003); Panel Discussion, The Evolving Legal
and Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:
Panel 2: The Evolution of Corporate Governance, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 613, 615 (2002).
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standards under existing legal precedent can help encourage appropriate gate-
keeper behavior; however, by themselves they are insufficient to prevent fur-
ther corporate fraud. Laws and precedent intended to deter bad actions were
plentiful at the time that Enron and WorldCom imploded and while SOX
strengthens the regulatory regime governing gatekeepers, it does not do
enough.
What SOX fails to do, and what needs to be done to support the goal of
meaningful fraud deterrence, is to explicitly reinstate aiding and abetting li-
ability in private actions. This simple act would strengthen current efforts to
hold gatekeepers to high standards of conduct and responsibility and would
empower private parties to help monitor and police the capital markets. Al-
lowing private parties to pursue aiding and abetting claims against gatekeep-
ers would decrease the burden on the SEC and other regulatory agencies at a
time when their resources are already stretched thin.' °9 Finally, a clear articu-
lation of aiding and abetting liability would help clarify the law regarding
gatekeeper liability by removing the need for courts to argue over whether the
bright line or substantial participation for secondary actor liability should
apply.
Several methods could be used to reinstate aiding and abetting liability.
First, the Supreme Court could expressly overrule Central Bank. This would
send a clear message, but the Court is unlikely to take such action, despite the
disagreement in the circuits, as evidenced by the lack of uniformity on what
the appropriate standard should be to find an actor liable as a primary viola-
tor. As an alternative to Supreme Court action, lower courts could resolve the
current disagreement about secondary actor liability by uniformly rejecting
the bright line test and adopting an expansive interpretation of the substantial
participation or creation test, as illustrated by the Enron Court. This would
achieve a comparable result, and would result in holding more gatekeepers
accountable; however, in light of the strong position of some of the circuits,
this also seems unlikely.
Furthermore, even if the lower courts proved willing to hold gatekeepers
liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by characterizing them as primary
violators, doing so does nothing to further the goals of clarity and transpar-
ency in the law. As Enron shows, it is possible to tweak the language of Cen-
109. The fact that the SEC has limited resources is commonly acknowledged. See,
e.g., Major Human Capital Challenges at SEC and Key Trade Agencies: Hearing
Before the S. Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Mgmt., Restructuring and the Dist. of
Columbia, Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 5-6 (2002) (statement of
Richard J. Hillman, Director of Financial Markets and Community Investments, and
Loren Yager, Director of International Affairs and Trade ("[L]imited resources have
forced SEC to be selective in its enforcement activities")); Shaun Mulreed, Comment,
Private Securities Litigation Reform Failure: How Scienter Has Prevented the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 From Achieving its Goals, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 779, 782 (2005) ("Due to limited resources, the SEC is unable to in-
vestigate and ultimately prosecute every possible case of fraud.").
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tral Bank in such a way as to impose primary actor liability on gatekeepers,
but doing so involves linguistic gymnastics, which add little useful guidance
to others. Language matters; if the end goal is the re-establishment of aiding
and abetting liability, it would be better to do so explicitly, rather than
through convoluted interpretation and application of current law.
Rather than leaving it to courts to "legislate from the bench," Congress
should expressly re-establish aiding and abetting liability through the addition
of a provision to SOX. The language of such a provision is already available
- it could simply be taken directly from Section 104 of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.10 That provision authorizes the SEC to pur-
sue injunctive actions for aiding and abetting violations of certain securities
laws, and expressly governs the "liability of controlling persons and persons
who aid and abet violations.""' Section 104 provides in relevant part:
09 Prosecution of Persons Who Aid and Abet Violations.-- For
purposes of any action brought by the Commission under para-
graph (1) or (3) of section [78u(d) of this title], any person that
knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person in vio-
lation of a provision of this [chapter], or of any rule or regulation
issued under this [chapter], shall be deemed to be in violation of
such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such as-
sistance is provided." 1
2
This language is virtually identical to that frequently used by lower fed-
eral courts in articulating the elements of aiding and abetting under Section
10(b) before Central Bank eliminated private causes of action for aiding and
abetting."13 The elements of Section 104 clearly mirror the elements courts
traditionally used to define aiding and abetting under Section 10(b). Because
the language is the same as used by courts prior to Central Bank, ample
precedent exists that has already established standards of liability; thus there
will be no need to start from scratch.
110. Private Sec. Litig. Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737 (1995).
111. Id. § 104, 109 Stat. at 757 (emphasis added).
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. See, e.g., Levine v. Diamantnuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (1990) ("To
state a claim of aiding and abetting securities fraud, one must plead (1) the existence
of an independent primary wrong, (2) actual knowledge or reckless disregard by the
alleged aider and abetter of the wrong and of his or her role in furthering it, and (3)
substantial assistance in the wrong."); Abell v. Potomoc Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104,
1126 (5th Cir. 1988) ("(1) There must have been a securities violation by the primary
party; (2) the aider and abetter must have had a 'general awareness' of its role in a
Rule lOb-5 violation; and (3) the aider and abetter must have knowingly rendered
'substantial assistance' in the rule 10b-5 violation.").
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VIII. Is RE-INSTATING AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY
WORTHWHILE?
It is, of course, impossible to know with certainty whether reinstating
aiding and abetting liability would make a significant contribution to deter-
ring fraud in the capital markets. Increasing the risk of liability for fraud
should have a deterrent effect on those gatekeepers whose behavior is tar-
geted by regulation. One of the premises of the judicial system is that the
threat of sanctions increases deterrence. Is aiding and abetting a sufficiently
serious problem such that Congress should act to revitalize it? Again, it is
impossible to know for sure, but on this point, some hard data is available. In
SOX, Congress directed the SEC to conduct a study and submit a report (the
"Section 703 Report"' 14) examining the behavior of "securities profession-
als."'"15 The Section 703 Report detailed violations of the federal securities
laws and classified offenders as either primary violators, aiders and abettors
or both." 6 The Report covers the years from 1998-2001."' During that time,
the SEC found that 1,299 securities professionals had committed primary
violations of the securities laws, while only 13 were found solely to have
aiding and abetted such violations. 18 An additional 284 were found to be
both primary violators and aiders and abettors.
119
Because the vast majority of claims brought by the SEC were against
primary violators, these numbers may seem to suggest that aiding and abet-
ting violations are not a significant problem and that Congress need not act to
reinstate liability for such violations,. However, in light of certain facts, this
perception should change. First, the focus of the SEC during the time of re-
porting was on securities professionals who were the primary actors in the
challenged transaction, and as such, were naturally held liable as principal
violators. Data from the Section 703 Report shows that of the 1,735 total vio-
114. Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission: Section 703 of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002, Study and Report on Violations by Securities Professionals,
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox703report.pdf, at 1 [hereinafter SEC Report].
115. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 703, 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745, 798-99 (2002). "[S]ecurities professionals" is defined
as "public accountants, public accounting firms, investment bankers, investment ad-
visers, brokers, dealers, attorneys, and other securities professionals practicing before
the Commission." Id. "[O]ther securities professionals" is defined to include "indi-
viduals associated with an investment adviser or investment company; transfer agents;
stock promoters; and chief or principal financial officers of public companies." See
SEC Report, supra note 114, at 2.
116. See SEC Report, supra note 114, at 1. The SEC was able to collect data on
aiding and abetting because it retains the ability to bring such claims. Central Bank
bars only private actions, not agency-instituted ones.
117. See id. at 1.
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lations reported,12 796 were committed by individuals associated with bro-
ker/dealers' 2 1 and 239 were committed by a broker/dealer firm. 22 When
looking at violations committed by entities or individuals considered as sec-
ondary actors, the numbers drop precipitously - accounting firms had only 13
findings of violations, while attorneys had 49 23 These numbers may suggest
that secondary actors commit fewer violations and are therefore not worth
pursuing. But that argument has several flaws. First, all of those involved
with fraud should be held accountable. These numbers tell us very little about
the number of violations actually committed by secondary actors. The focus
of the SEC investigations was on primary actors because that is where SOX
demanded the agency place its attention.124 There is no way to determine
what incidence of aiding and abetting liability would have been uncovered
had that activity been more rigorously pursued.
In truth, knowing the precise number of gatekeepers who engage in aid-
ing and abetting, while interesting, is not that important. If reinstating the
ability of private parties to bring actions deters just one such actor, reinstate-
ment is worth it. It would perhaps give some sense of purpose and security to
the millions of defrauded investors who lost their life savings in the financial
meltdown of the late 1990's and early 2000's, or to others who may find
themselves in similar situations. Our capital markets depend on investors
having faith in. the integrity of those involved. Empowering investors to help
rid the markets of bad actors would help them regain the trust necessary to
maintain a financially viable market.
In addition to giving a sense of empowerment to investors, reinstating a
private right of action for aiding and abetting under Section 10(b) and Rule
1Ob-5 would allow investors to act as additional monitors over gatekeeper
behavior. The resources of the SEC are finite - the agency simply cannot do
it alone. In fact, some argue that recent trends at the SEC suggest that its po-
licing function is likely to diminish in the future. 25 Whether or not such pre-
dictions turn out to be true, it can only benefit both the agency and the mar-
kets to have an additional body of monitors.
Those who oppose reinstituting the ability of private parties to bring aid-
ing and abetting claims make several arguments against doing so. First, some
argue that further regulation is not necessary because the frauds that corpora-
120. Id. App. A, at 6.
121. Id. App. A, at 3.
122. Id. App. A, at 2.
123. Id. App. A, at 1-2.
124. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 703, 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745, 798-99 (2002).
125. See, e.g, Robert Kuttner, Californian Chris Cox, the President's Choice to
Reverse the Reforms at the SEC, could be Bush's Singly Most Destructive Regulatory
Appointee, THE AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 2005, at 13 (reporting concerns that the newly
appointed Chairman may decrease regulatory focus); With Ease, 3 Nominees Win
Seats on S.E.C., N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 2005, at C2 (same).
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tions such as Enron and WorldCom committed were the result of "a classic
bubble that overtook the equity markets in the late 1990s and produced a
market euphoria in which gatekeepers became temporarily irrelevant."' 126 For
"bubble" advocates, which includes Alan Greenspan 27 , no action is neces-
sary to prevent gatekeeper bad behavior. Instead, automatic market correction
will occur as the "bubble" bursts and gatekeepers regain their sense and their
power. Faced with increasingly skeptical investors, issuers will no longer be
able to dictate the rules of the game, and gatekeepers will resume their tradi-
tional functions.
This somewhat utopian position is hard to support. First, to accept it,
one must accept that the financial catastrophes of recent years were caused by
an irrational bubble in the markets and not by systemic failure. Further, to
accept the bubble position, one must also accept that gatekeepers and issuers
will not repeat their bad behavior in a "non-bubble" market. That belief
seems idealistic at best. As powerfully pointed out by Marlene O'Conner, the
power of "groupthink" is strong. The incentives to commit fraud are espe-
cially strong in the corporate arena where there are vast sums of money at
stake. It would be naive at best to suppose that those incentives will vanish.
Human ingenuity is boundless - the particular types of fraud witnessed in the
last round of scandal may be over, but there are certainly other forms waiting
to be devised. It is simply unrealistic to presume that fraudulent behavior will
vanish.
It could also be argued that reinstating aiding and abetting liability
would increase costs to issuers as gatekeepers increase their fees to offset
potential risk. While this is a plausible argument, it is simply not convincing.
Under the current regime, gatekeepers face uncertainty as to their potential
liability. That uncertainty must be compensated for, meaning that gatekeepers
already build that cost into their fees. Thus, it is unlikely that removing uncer-
tainty by establishing more clearly-defined legal standards would increase
costs.
Another argument raised against reinstating aiding and abetting liability
is that doing so will flood the courts with securities fraud claims. On one
level, this assertion can be quickly discounted by a blanket refusal to yield to
any such "slippery slope" position. Additionally, this argument is countered
by the fact that all aiding and abetting claims would have to meet the heavy
126. Coffee, supra note 103, at 1412.
127. See generally Chairman Alan Greenspan, Corporate Governance, Remarks at
the Stem School of Business, New York University, Mar. 26, 2002,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/200203262/default.htm.
128. See Marleen O'Connor, The Enron Board, The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1233 (2003). "Groupthink" refers to the phenomenon where the cohesive
nature of a group causes its members to strive for unanimity and overrides their moti-
vation to realistically appraise alternative courses of actions. Id. at 1238.
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burdens set before them by the PSLRA129 and other securities laws. Thus,
aiding and abetting claims will have to satisfy all of the elements of Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 and will have to be pled with specificity, among other
requirements. The likelihood that such claims would overwhelm the courts is
minimal.
IX. CONCLUSION
Despite the controversy over what exactly "caused" the most recent cor-
porate scandals, there is widespread agreement that gatekeepers - those actors
best positioned to help prevent fraud - failed miserably. Court decisions and
legislation forthcoming after the meltdown at Enron, WorldCom and others
demonstrate judicial and Congressional will to take strong action to prevent
future recurrence of these tragedies. While admirable, these "fixes" do not go
far enough. Allowing gatekeepers to avoid liability by remaining behind the
scenes, actively participating in transactions that reek of deception diminishes
our markets. Greed and deception will not disappear on their own. The human
capacity to create new and ingenious schemes and devices to defraud is
boundless. It is time to recognize the significant role gatekeepers can and
should play in deterring bad action and to hold them responsible when they
fail to do so.
It is time to break the Bank, to recognize explicitly what Congress and
the courts have done implicitly. Reinstating aiding and abetting liability will
strengthen our securities regulation regime at a time when such a result is
clearly the will of all involved.
129. For discussions of these burdens see, for example, Lisa L. Casey, Reforming
Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging,
2003 BYU L. REv. 1239 (2003); Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Plead-
ing, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 987, 988-89 n.7 (2003); Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Se-
curities Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 95 (2004).
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